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EURO-AMERICAN RHETORICAL PRAGMATISM:

attention to rhetoric or (more narrowly in Rorty’s case)

DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION, HUMANIST CONTROVERSIES,

persuasion in the public sphere and connect this
rhetorical attention explicitly to their articulation of

AND PURPOSEFUL MEDIATION

pragmatism as a philosophical or critical theory. Such

Steven Mailloux

rhetorical pragmatism can be viewed as a version of

Loyola Marymount University

postmodern sophistry: These neo-pragmatists are like
some older Greek sophists partly because they share the
pre-Platonic belief in a primordial unity of rhetoric and
For over a century Euro-American pragmatism has
developed as a philosophical movement that takes
seriously the human significance of language. Indeed,

philosophy. Viewed from within the historical argument
made by Edward Schiappa and others, sophists and
pragmatists do not radically separate language use from
2

one might characterize much pragmatist thought as
specifically being preoccupied with rhetoric, the use of
language in a context to have effects. Inside the
academy this rhetorical pragmatism often registers as a
language-centered

form

of

humanistic

anti-

foundationalism that refuses absolute distinctions
between subject and object, meaning and significance,

the search for truth, rhetoric from philosophy. It was
Plato, the argument goes, who established this
separation in the Gorgias when he coined the new term
rhêtorikê

and

negatively

distinguished

it

from

philosophia. Rhetorical pragmatists reject this version of
Platonism and embrace instead an anti-Platonist
sophistic rhetoric.

fact and value, knowledge and opinion, aesthetics and
politics. In various non-academic public spheres, one
version of this pragmatism supports a progressive
pluralism and an inclusive deliberative democracy. In the
following remarks, I would like to explore this tradition
of Euro-American rhetorical pragmatism and one of its
prominent features: a rhetoric of purposeful mediation.

But these contemporary neo-pragmatists do not
emphasize their sophistic legacy as extensively as an
earlier rhetorical pragmatist, the once-forgotten British
philosopher, F. C. S. Schiller. I want to return here to an
argument I made in my book Reception Histories, in
which I claimed that Schiller’s reading of Protagoras was
essential to his early version of pragmatism that he
3

Among recent rhetorical pragmatists we might include
such academic and public intellectuals as Giles Gunn,
Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, Cornel West, and Jeffrey
Stout.

1

These are neo-pragmatists who give special

called humanism. During the turn to the twentieth
century, the discourse of absolute idealism dominated
the rhetorical context of philosophical debate in
England. It was explicitly against this epistemological and
metaphysical hegemony that F. C. S. Schiller directed
much of his polemical energies, especially in his two

1

See Steven Mailloux, Reception Histories: Rhetoric,
Pragmatism, and American Cultural Politics (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 22-42; idem,
Disciplinary Identities: Rhetorical Paths of English,
Speech, and Composition (New York: Modern Language
Association, 2006), pp. 42-44, 51-52, 118-21; Steven
Mailloux and Keith Gilyard, “Conversation,” in:
Conversations in Cultural Rhetoric and Composition
Studies, ed. Keith Gilyard and Victor E. Taylor (Aurora:
Davies Group, 2009), pp. 30-51. Also see Stanley Fish,
“Rhetoric,” in: The Stanley Fish Reader, ed. H. Aram
Veeser (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 116-44; Keith
Gilyard, Composition and Cornel West: Notes toward a
Deep Democracy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 2008); Robert Danisch, Pragmatism,
Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric (Columbia:

University of South Carolina Press, 2007); and Nathan
Crick, Democracy and Rhetoric: John Dewey on the Arts
of Becoming (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 2010).
2
Edward Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos: A Study in
Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 40-49; Mailloux,
Reception Histories, pp. xii-xiii.
3
Mailloux, Reception Histories, pp. 27-32. Also see Mark
J. Porrovecchio, F. C. S. Schiller and the Dawn of
Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011); and, more generally,
Rhetoric, Sophistry, Pragmatism, ed. Steven Mailloux
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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early books Humanism in 1903 and Studies in Humanism

over Protagorean sophistry and Platonist philosophy.

four years later. Both of these books were praised by the

During one such controversy, Schiller’s 1903 book

American pragmatists, William James and John Dewey,

rejected the Platonist’s charge that the human-measure

the former calling Schiller pragmatism’s “most vivacious

dictum leads to skepticism and relativism. Instead,

4

Schiller argues, Protagoras’s claim that “man is the

and pugnacious champion.”

measure of all things,” when “fairly interpreted, … is the
features of Schiller’s

truest and most important thing that any thinker ever

humanistic pragmatism was his use of Protagorean

has propounded. It is only in travesties such as it suited

sophistry as an explanatory argument for his own

Plato’s dialectic purpose to circulate that it can be said to

theory. In fact, it is not too much of an exaggeration to

tend to skepticism; in reality it urges Science to discover

say that Schiller’s reception of Protagoras constituted his

how Man may measure, and by what devices make

philosophical position. That reception was an exemplary

concordant his measures with those of his fellow-men.”

instance of a theoretical argument reading the past to

One goal of sophistic rhetoric is to investigate and

mark out a place in the intellectual present and to set an

theorize how this rhetorical process takes place, to

agenda for the immediate future. Schiller’s pragmatism

establish what rhetorical “devices make concordant” one

re-interpreted sophistry to establish his anti-idealist

citizen’s measures with those of his or her fellow-

argument within the cultural conversation of the early

citizens.

One of the distinguishing

6

twentieth century. Schiller read Plato against the grain of
the ancient philosopher’s attack on sophistic rhetoric,

In his next book, Studies in Humanism, Schiller more

and in so doing, he demonstrated how the insights of

clearly and more extensively demonstrates how his

pragmatism and sophistry coincided perfectly. Schiller’s

humanism is both sophistic and pragmatist. He remarks

reception of the sophists locates at least one form of

on the political context of classical Greece, noting that

pragmatism firmly within a sophistic rhetorical tradition,

“the great humanistic movement of the fifth century

and Schiller enthusiastically argued for branding this

B.C., of which [the Sophists] were the leaders, is now

form with the name “humanism.”

[early twentieth century] beginning to be appreciated at
its true value … The rise of democracies rendered a

Humanism has always been about human being and

higher education and a power of public speaking a sine

becoming. In classical Greece, Protagoras said, “Humans

qua non of political influence – and, what acted probably

are the measure of all things, of things that are that they

as a still stronger incentive – of the safety of the life and

are and of things that are not that they are not.”

property, particularly of the wealthier classes.” The

Platonists rejected such sophistry and could quote in

political, economic context of sophistic education

support of their case the Athenian in Plato’s Laws who

resulted in “a great development of rhetoric and

declares “it is God who is the measure of all things, not
humanity as some say” (716c). Though often in other
terms, some of the most important “humanist
controversies” of the last century restaged this debate

4

William James, “Humanism,” Nation 78 (3 March
1904), pp. 175-76; rpt. James, Essays, Comments, and
Reviews, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers,
and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1987), p. 551.

84

5

See, for example, late-twentieth-century debates in
the U.S. Culture Wars and specialized academic
controversies over postmodernism or poststructuralism.
Various anti-humanisms, neo-humanisms, and posthumanisms marked out significant theoretical positions
within these heated intellectual and political conflicts.
On the rhetoric of these and other humanist
controversies, see Mailloux, Reception Histories, pp. 2021, 151-81; and “Humanist Controversies: The Rhetorical
Humanism of Ernesto Grassi and Michael Leff,”
Philosophy and Rhetoric (forthcoming).
6
F. C. S Schiller, Humanism: Philosophical Essays
(London: Macmillan, 1903), p. xvii.
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dialectic,” and the sophists definitely exploited this

and dubbed them the ‘progressive Obama’ and the

situation, growing wealthy in catering to their well-to-do

‘post-partisan Obama.’” According to Hayes, “pragmatic”

clientele.

7

Schiller

remarks

in

passing

on

the

here means something like “post-ideological.” Saying

contradictory (democratic and undemocratic) origins of

Obama is a pragmatist means simply that he is not a

sophistic rhetoric and thus prefigures later debates over

dogmatic ideologue; he is someone interested in

the problematic ideological affiliations of neo-sophistry

practically getting things done and not someone blindly

and the dangerous political consequences of rhetoric

following an abstract ideological principle. But these are

more generally. Like many rhetorical pragmatists after

merely popular uses of the terms pragmatic and

him, Schiller identifies rhetoric with democracy – only in

pragmatist. What, if anything, do they have to do with

such a political structure, he argues, could sophistic

the more precise usage in relation to the specific

rhetoric develop – but he also acknowledges that

tradition of American pragmatist philosophy?

rhetoric could serve undemocratic interests when
rhetorical education was restricted to the socio-

Hayes himself raises this question when he notes:

economic elites.
Pragmatism in common usage may mean simply
a practical approach to problems and affairs. But
it’s also the name of the uniquely American
school of philosophy whose doctrine is that truth
is pre-eminently to be tested by the practical
consequences of belief. What unites the two
senses of the word is a shared skepticism toward
certainties derived from abstractions – one that
is welcome and bracing after eight years of [the]
failed, faith-based presidency [of President
George W. Bush].

There is a lot more to say about Schiller’s reading of
Protagoras, especially in his 1908 pamphlet, Plato or
Protagoras?, but instead I want to move on to some
implications of the sophistic legacy for rhetorical
pragmatism in relation to contemporary debates over
the future of democratic deliberation. To make this
move I will fast forward exactly one hundred years.

Hayes then tries to connect Obama intellectually to
“In case you haven’t heard, Barack Obama is a
pragmatist.” So begins Christopher Hayes’s December
2008 Nation article called, fittingly enough, “The
8

Pragmatist.” After noting how the term has often been
used to describe the newly elected President and how
that President himself has used the word “pragmatism”

American pragmatist philosophy by way of the
President’s political admiration for Abraham Lincoln. He
implies that Obama’s admiration for Lincoln connects
him to American pragmatism partly because the war
Lincoln oversaw was a significant influence on the
earliest philosophical pragmatists:

in recent public statements, Hayes asks: what exactly

Having witnessed, and in some cases
experienced firsthand, the horror of violence and
irreconcilable ideological conflict during the Civil
War, William James, Charles Peirce and Oliver
Wendell Holmes were moved to reject the
metaphysical certainty in eternal truths that had
so motivated the [dogmatically ideological]
abolitionists, emphasizing instead epistemic
humility, contingency and the acquisition of
9
knowledge through practice – trial and error.

does it mean to call President Obama a pragmatist? In
answering this question, Hayes helpfully points to
“Obama’s famous rhetorical dexterity, which he’s
marshaled to tremendous effect – giving progressives as
well as centrists reasons to believe he shares their values
and outlook. In a postelection essay on Obama, George
Packer noted these two strains of his campaign rhetoric
7

F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (London:
Macmillan, 1907), pp. 31-32.
8
Christopher Hayes, “The Pragmatist,” The Nation (29
December 2008), pp. 13-16.
http://www. thenation.com/article/pragmatist (accessed
Dec 15, 2011).

9

For a different, more detailed argument tying Obama
to Pragmatism via Lincoln, see Susan Schulten, “Barack
Obama, Abraham Lincoln, and John Dewey,” Denver
University Law Review, vol. 86 (2009), pp. 807-818.
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I will return later to the placing of President Obama in

and the new. James famously defined pragmatism as a

the pragmatist tradition, but for now I want to re-deploy

method of thinking and a theory of truth. The method

a text Hayes cites in explaining that tradition, Louis

looked to results, consequences of beliefs, ideas, actions;

Menand’s The Metaphysical Club. We can use a passage

and truth was defined controversially as what works.

from Menand’s prize-winning book to transform Hayes’s

“The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be

specific claim for a connection between pragmatism and

good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite,

Obama into a broader argument about American

assignable reasons.”

pragmatism and U.S. rhetoric in general. Menand writes

opening for teasing out the contours of a specifically

that after the Civil War the pragmatists “changed the

rhetorical pragmatism: The true is the rhetorical

way Americans thought – and continue to think – about

compliment we give (the figurative label we posit) for

education, democracy, liberty, justice, and tolerance.

whatever proves itself (argumentatively justifies itself

And as a consequence, they changed the way Americans

through reasons) to be good in the way of belief. Put

live – the way they learn, the way they express their

differently,

views, the way they understand themselves, and the way

pragmatism is to work out the way that pragmatism as a

they treat people who are different from themselves.

philosophical movement is a rhetorical way of thinking

We are still living, to a great extent, in a country these

with a rhetorical theory of truth. As James explains his

10

Among Menand’s claims

pragmatist approach more fully, he makes its strategy of

here most relevant to my topic are the ones asserting

purposeful mediation explicit. James calls pragmatism “a

that

way

mediator and a reconciler,” a “mediator between tough-

Americans express themselves (their rhetoric) and the

mindedness and tender-mindedness,” and a “mediator

way they interpret themselves (their identities), what we

between empiricism and religion”

thinkers helped to make.”

pragmatism

significantly

affected

the

might call an American rhetorical hermeneutics.

11

to

12

That last phrase provides an

identify

a

specifically

13

rhetorical

He describes

I

pragmatism “as a mediating system” and offers

would like to follow up on just one strand of this

“pragmatistic philosophy” as “just the mediating way of

rhetorical hermeneutics and speculate about Euro-

thinking” his audience requires.

14

American pragmatism’s effects on U.S. rhetoric in
various academic and non-academic contexts. This

We find this same mediating way of thinking and its

speculation involves making a case for pragmatism as a

embodiment in a rhetoric of mediation throughout the

possible source for or at least influence on an American

American pragmatist tradition. Pragmatism is an

rhetoric of purposeful mediation.

intellectual solution to a cultural problem, which means
it is a pragmatic response to a question in a specific time

An obvious place to begin is William James’s 1907 book

and place. A typical problem or question for pragmatism

Pragmatism, whose very subtitle “A New Name for Some

arises from the public recognition of a widespread

Old Ways of Thinking” implies a mediating purpose for

cultural conflict; and the typical pragmatist response is

James’s popular lectures, a mediation between the old

not to choose sides but to mediate. This mediating
rhetorical strategy can be seen in James’s Pragmatism in

10

Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A Story of
Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2001), p. xi (emphasis added).
11
A rhetorical hermeneutics focuses on the relation of
rhetoric and interpretation and in one of its forms
combines rhetorical pragmatism in philosophical theory
with cultural rhetoric study in critical practice. See
Steven Mailloux, Rhetorical Power (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), pp. 3-18; and Disciplinary
Identities, pp. 42-65.

86

1907 and almost a hundred years later in Jeffrey Stout’s
Democracy and Tradition. Interestingly, the conflicts

12

William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some
Old Ways of Thinking (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1978), p. 42.
13
Ibid., p. 43, 129, 7.
14
Ibid., p. 7, 26.
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addressed by both thinkers involve religion. In James’s

that it focuses on activities [practices] held in common

case it is a conflict between Darwinian Science and

as constitutive of the political community.”

Christian Religion; for Stout it is a dispute over the role

practical activities of a democracy are not just

of religion in a democratic polis. James addresses his

procedural forms: “They are activities in which

problem by mediating between what he calls tough-

normative commitments are embedded as well as

minded and tender-minded mental make-ups; Stout’s

discussed. The commitments are substantive. They guide

rhetoric mediates between liberal democratic secularists

the discussion, but they are also constantly in dispute,

and what he calls the new anti-liberal traditionalists.

subject to revision, and not fully determinate.”

19

But the

20

Stout

gives as examples of texts that embody such democratic
In Democracy and Tradition Stout proposes to resolve

normative values the Bill of Rights, the Emancipation

the dispute over the contemporary role of religion in the

Proclamation and the Nineteenth Amendment, Lincoln’s

public sphere by arguing that pragmatism as (what he

Second Inaugural, and Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a

provocatively calls) “democratic traditionalism” makes

Woman.” Stout advocates the rhetorical practices of

room for religious voices in political deliberation.

15

Like

public deliberation and notes the other social practices

James though less explicitly than Schiller, he makes use

in which rhetorical activities are situated and which

of rhetorical concepts and traditions all along the way.

serve as topics of deliberation, such as voting and the

For Stout “culture is an enduring collection of social

electoral process.

practices, embedded in institutions of a characteristic
kind, reflected in specific habits and intuitions, and

Stout specifically takes up the question: What “is the

capable of giving rise to recognizable forms of human

role of free public reason in a political culture that

character.”

16

One particular aspect of culture is central

includes conflicting religious conceptions of the good”?

21

to Stout’s mediating rhetorical strategy. That aspect is

To answer this question, he rhetorically focuses on “the

tradition: “a matter of enduring attitudes, concerns,

discursive core of democratic culture,” noting that “by

dispositions, and patterns of conduct”; for example a

highlighting the significance of public deliberation,

democratic tradition “inculcates certain habits of

democratic political arrangements bring to light their

reasoning, certain attitudes toward deference and

symbiotic relationship to a surrounding culture in which

authority in political discussion, and love for certain

the shared discursive practices of the people are of

17

22

23

goods and virtues.” Underlying these notions of culture

primary importance.”

Stout’s rhetoric of purposeful

and tradition is a theory of practices and a value given to

mediation develops a pragmatist account of U.S.

particular rhetorical practices within certain traditions,

democratic culture, rhetorically analyzing both past

such as democracy.

mediated conflicts and present conflicts in need of
mediation. In so doing, Stout notes the mediating

Stout’s primary aim is to “make plain” how “a tradition

strategies of others in the pragmatist tradition. For

of democratic reasoning, dispositions, and attitudes that

example, he notes how in an earlier time “Dewey sought

the people have in common” serves as the “adhesive

a spiritual path between the extremes of militant

element in our sociality.”

18

Stout thus claims that his

atheism and arrogant traditionalism.”

24

“conception of the civic nation is pragmatic in the sense
19
15

Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 13.
16
Ibid., p. 28
17
Ibid., p. 3.
18
Ibid., p. 4.

Ibid., p. 4-5.
Ibid., p. 5.
21
Ibid., p. 2.
22
Ibid., p. 195.
23
Ibid., p. 4.
24
Ibid., p. 32.
20
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Armed with rhetorical pragmatist assumptions, Stout

recommends a specific kind of “conversation”: “an

characterizes the current impasse within American

exchange of views in which the respective parties

democratic deliberation as a conflict between secular

express their premises in as much detail as they see fit

liberal political philosophers and religious-oriented, anti-

and in whatever idiom they wish, try to make sense of

liberal-democratic new traditionalists. Because of the

each other’s perspectives, and expose their own

discord resulting from religious diversity, “secular

commitments to the possibility of criticism.”

liberals,” he writes, “have strongly urged people to

This practical, rhetorical accomplishment can be assisted

restrain themselves from bringing their religious

by theoretical articulation, self-reflective commentary

commitments with them into the political sphere.” In

on both the substance and process of the ongoing

contrast, “many religious people have grown frustrated

accomplishment. Stout sees such metacommentary to

at the unwillingness of the liberal elite to hear them out

be the special task of public philosophers, to whom

on their own terms, and have recently had much to say

Stout recommends adopting a pragmatist point of view.

25

This pragmatist viewpoint sees the “function of moral

Stout’s mediating rhetoric, like James’s before him,

principles with respect to the ethical life of a people” to

argues for (what I am calling) a rhetorical pragmatism,

be “essentially expressive, a matter of making explicit in

one that “can transcend the current standoff between

the form of a claim a kind of commitment that would

secular liberals and the new traditionalists – and do so

otherwise remain implicit and obscure.” The role of

against the hypocrisies and biases of secularism.”

by borrowing crucial insights from both sides.”

26

Thus,

he argues against “the Manichean rhetoric of cultural
27

warfare,”

28

“public philosophy,” then, should be a rhetoricallymediating “exercise in expressive rationality.”

29

That is,

and for the pragmatic rhetoric of conflict

public philosophers are intellectuals who express the

mediation, not complete resolution but rather respectful

reasons implicitly motivating citizens in their public

recognition of both basic disagreement and shared

deliberations. But we might just as easily characterize

consensual values.

the public intellectual who performs this expressive
theoretical function as a rhetorician. In fact, isn’t this

Such pragmatist mediation is a practical accomplishment
sometimes aided by theoretical articulation. As practical
accomplishment, overcoming conflict takes place in a
democracy through public deliberation and development
of character, that is, collectively through democratic
consensus and individually through democratic virtue. As
a rhetorical accomplishment within public deliberation,
pragmatic

mediation

development

of

of

conflict

consensual

requires

overlap,

not

the
prior

overarching agreement about the content of abstract
concepts and principles. It requires verbally holding
others responsible to give reasons for their opinions but
not restricting beforehand the kind of reasons (secular
or religious) that can be used in the public sphere. For all
citizens participating in democratic deliberation, Stout

public theoretical articulation an area where again the
philosophy/rhetoric distinction (certainly the opposition)
tends to collapse, and thus couldn’t we say that the
pragmatist public intellectual is not just rhetorical in his
or her mediating practice but also sophistic in theoretical
orientation?

Following

Ibid., p. 63.
Ibid., p. 13.
27
Ibid., p. 10.

88

interpretation

of

Protagoras, doesn’t a rhetorical pragmatist today
assume the human-measure maxim (even when the
appeal is to the divine) and try to discover and establish
what rhetorical “devices make concordant” one citizen’s
measures with those of fellow-citizens? Stout as a
rhetorical pragmatist attempts to fulfill his role as public
philosopher through the theoretical articulations of his
book Democracy and Tradition. In so doing, he presents
a sophistic rhetorical pragmatist framework for public

25
26

Schiller’s

28
29

Ibid., p. 10-11.
Ibid., p. 12.
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deliberation in a democracy, advocating a rhetorical

referred

to

Niebuhr

philosophers.”

strategy of purposeful mediation.

34

as

one

of

his

“favorite

Asked what he got out of Niebuhr,

Obama responded that he took away “the compelling
Let me conclude by returning to the academic and

idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and hardship

popular claim that President Obama is a pragmatist, in

and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our

my view a rhetorical pragmatist. To date the most

belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t

comprehensive study published on Obama’s pragmatist

use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take

roots is James T. Kloppenberg’s Reading Obama:

away ... the sense we have to make these efforts

Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition. A

knowing they are hard, and not swinging from naïve

noted intellectual historian, Kloppenberg charts the

idealism to bitter realism.” Here we see the same

marked influence of philosophical pragmatism on

mediating rhetoric, mediating between pessimism and

Obama’s intellectual development from the readings and

optimism, between idealism and realism, that we find

discussions in his Harvard Law School courses to his

elsewhere

immersion in Deweyan progressive political thinking

tradition, including in Niebuhr’s own book The Irony of

during his days as a Chicago community organizer and as

American History, which, for example, praises the

30

mediating strain of American thought “most perfectly

Kloppenberg comments often on Obama’s mediating

expressed by James Madison” who “combined Christian

style, his “commitments to philosophical pragmatism

realism in the interpretation of human motives and

and deliberative democracy – to building support slowly,

desires with Jefferson’s passion for liberty.”

a law professor at the University of Chicago.

gradually,

through

consensus building.”

compromise
31

and

throughout

the

American

pragmatist

35

painstaking

Kloppenberg calls Obama “a

principled partisan of democracy and pragmatism in the
tradition of James and Dewey. He believes in the
founders’ ideals of equality and liberty. But he believes
that achieving those goals requires working to forge
agreement about forms of democratic experimentation,
and he believes that those experiments must be
followed by the critical assessment of results.”

32

Perhaps the most striking example of Obama’s own
pragmatist rhetoric of mediation involves his thoughtful
response to the passionate rhetoric of Reverend
Jeremiah Wright and his vociferous critics. In Dreams
from My Father, Obama had described his admiration for
Reverend Wright, who, he noted, was a reader of Paul
Tillich,

Reinhold

theologians.

36

Niebuhr,

and

black

liberation

Then, famously and still controversially,

Obama demonstrated his skill at mediating rhetoric in an
Besides connecting Obama with the classical early

18 March 2008 speech, “A More Perfect Union,” in

pragmatists, Kloppenberg also mentions the influence of

which he (at least for the moment) refused to repudiate

Reinhold Niebuhr, whom Cornel West and others call a

Wright despite his disagreement with his views.

Christian pragmatist.

33

In 2007 candidate Obama

Throughout the speech, Obama tried to reconcile
without dissolving many differences, many oppositions,
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See James T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: Dreams,
Hope, and the American Political Tradition (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011), 63-71. Also see Bart
Schultz, “Obama’s Political Philosophy: Pragmatism,
Politics, and the University of Chicago,” Philosophy of the
Social Sciences, vol. 39 (2009), pp.127-73; and Robert
Danisch, “Obama and the Pragmatist Tradition,”
unpublished manuscript.
31
Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, p. 83.
32
Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, p. 221-222.
33
Kloppenberg, Reading Obama, pp. 22, 120, 250;
Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A

not the least of which was that between Black anger and

Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 150-164.
34
David Brooks, “Obama, Gospel and Verse,” New York
Times (26 April 2007), p. A25.
35
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New
York: Scribner, 1952), p. 96.
36
Barack Obama, Dreams from My Father: A Story of
Race and Inheritance (New York: Three Rivers Press,
2004), p. 282.
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White intolerance. Here is just one piece of Obama’s

done in difficult situations of extreme ideological

mediating,

partisanship.

unifying

rhetoric

about

“America’s

improbable experiment in democracy”: “I chose to run
for the presidency at this moment in history because I
believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of
our time unless we solve them together, unless we
perfect our union by understanding that we may have

Still, it is also worth noting the limits of mediating
rhetoric within deliberative democracy, limits fully
acknowledged by Obama in this passage from The
Audacity of Hope:

different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we

Democratic deliberation might have been
sufficient to expand the franchise to white men
without property and eventually women; reason,
argument, and American pragmatism might have
eased the economic growing pains of a great
nation and helped lessen religious and class
tensions that would plague other nations. But
deliberation alone could not provide the slave his
freedom or cleanse America of its original sin. In
the end, it was the sword that would sever his
39
chains.

may not look the same and we may not have come from
the same place, but we all want to move in the same
direction – towards a better future for our children and
our grandchildren.”

37

Given the argument I am making that Obama can be
viewed within a rhetorical pragmatist tradition, it is
somewhat ironic that three years into his presidency the
close fit between his rhetorical power and his mediating
pragmatism is being questioned by some of his former
supporters. In “The Pragmatic President” Fareed Zakaria
writes that liberals are disappointed with President

In light of such historical examples, Obama the rhetorical
pragmatist

38

the

limitations

of

rhetorical

pragmatism and its rhetoric of purposeful mediation. He
admits:

Obama “because of his persistent tendency to
compromise.”

notes

The best I can do in the face of our history is
remind myself that it has not always been the
pragmatist, the voice of reason, or the force of
compromise, that has created the conditions for
liberty. … I’m reminded that deliberation and the
constitutional order may sometimes be the
luxury of the powerful, and that it has sometimes
been the cranks, the zealots, the prophets, the
agitators, and the unreasonable – in other
words, the absolutists – that have fought for a
new order. Knowing this, I can’t summarily
dismiss those possessed of similar certainty
today – the antiabortion activist who pickets my
town hall meeting, or the animal rights activist
who raids a laboratory – no matter how deeply I
disagree with their views. I am robbed even of
the certainty of uncertainty – for sometimes
40
absolute truths may well be absolute.

Their criticism “stems from a liberal

fantasy that if only the President would give a stirring
speech, he would sweep the country along with the
sheer power of his poetry.” That is, prior to his election
and soon after, his supporters marveled at the rhetorical
power of his mediating progressive pragmatism. Now,
some of those same people criticize Obama for giving up
on the power of his rhetoric in the process of making
pragmatic compromises. In contrast, Zakaria defends the
President’s record of accomplishments in today’s highly
polarized politics: “Obama is a centrist and a pragmatist
who understands that in a country divided over core
issues, you cannot make the best the enemy of the

Ultimately, Obama turns back to the political figure with

good.” Thus, we might say, a pragmatist’s mediating

whom he has so often identified. He writes, “I’m left

rhetoric is sometimes the only way to get something

then with Lincoln, who like no man before or since
understood both the deliberative function of our
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democracy and the limits of such deliberation.”
forgetting

such

sobering

reminders,

41

Not

rhetorical

pragmatists will surely continue their strategic advocacy
of purposeful mediation, further developing the long
pragmatist tradition of a “mediating way of thinking”
within specialized intellectual debates as well as the
popular politics of our deliberative democracies.

41
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